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I
INTRODUCTION
As unlikely as it might seem, the large literature on the theory of corporate
criminal liability appears to have insufficiently attended to an important point. In
the endless debates about the purposes of corporate criminal liability, it has been
overlooked that corporations cannot be retributively punished.
This is a more particular point, with specific implications, than the familiar
and blunter claim that the application of criminal law to corporations is simply
nonsensical in terms of punishment theory’s concern with moral responsibility
because legal entities are not people.1 To the contrary, corporations can be
blameworthy, that is, they can do things that provide retributive justification for
punishment. Corporations also can be punished. The problem arises at the last
step of the analysis: Corporations cannot be punished retributively. This point, I
will claim, is important to understanding how corporate criminal liability has
developed and is practiced in contemporary legal systems.
To set the table, there are several premises that can claim wide though not
universal support. First, corporations act in the world, through the collective
actions of their agents. Second, when corporations act (or, if one prefers, when
they are the host or source for group actions), they sometimes generate risks and
harms. Third, some such risks and harms are properly designated as culpable
wrongs.
Mainstream retributivist theory holds that wrongdoers should or must be
punished because they deserve punishment on account of their wrongdoing.2
Various lines of argument about what wrongdoers retributively deserve have
Copyright © 2020 by Samuel W. Buell.
This Article is also available online at http://lcp.law.duke.edu/.
* Bernard M. Fishman Professor of Law, Duke University. buell@law.duke.edu. For essential comments,
criticisms, and guidance many thanks to Matt Adler, Jennifer Arlen, Mitch Berman, Mark Dsouza, Ben
Ewing, Kim Ferzan, Doug Husak, Alex Sarch, and all of the participants in the November 2019
symposium hosted by Law and Contemporary Problems at Duke Law School.
1. E.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into
the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 386 (1981) (quoting Edward, First Baron
Thurlow); Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 320–21 (1996).
2. Mitchell N. Berman, Modest Retributivism, in LEGAL, MORAL, AND METAPHYSICAL TRUTHS:
THE PHILOSOPHY OF MICHAEL S. MOORE 35, 37 (Kimberly Kessler Ferzan & Stephen J. Morse eds.,
2016); Mitchell N. Berman, Two Kinds of Retributivism, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CRIMINAL LAW 433, 433 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 2011) [hereinafter Berman, Two Kinds of
Retributivism]; Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER,
AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 179, 179 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987).
For an example of an alternative “axiological” account of retributivism that critiques the more
conventional deontic approach, see generally LEO ZAIBERT, RETHINKING PUNISHMENT (2018).
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pointed to suffering, pain, “hard treatment,” a “set back to interests,” or a
reduction in well-being as satisfying the retributive demand for acting upon
desert.3
Corporate retributivism founders here. As an empirical matter, only living
things can suffer, experience pain, or endure “hard treatment.” Corporations
might appear to be candidates for “setbacks to interests” or “reductions in wellbeing,” but only if one defines these concepts in ways that unmoor them from the
structure of retributive theory. Matters can go less well for a corporation as a
result of things done to it, including by legal processes. But a mere “set back” to
the economic prospects of a going concern cannot deliver a morally meaningful
deprivation that produces the good that retributivism demands in response to
the moral wrong of a crime. Therefore, corporations cannot be objects of
retributive punishment even if, as I and many others believe, corporations can be
blameworthy.4
Corporations easily can be punished. Legal process can do things to
corporations that are costly and influential, which may cause corporations,
through their agents, to change how they act. Thus, the literature is brimming
with consequentialist arguments for corporate criminal liability and corporate
punishment.5 But corporations cannot be retributively punished because they
cannot be harmed or set back in ways that could satisfy the requirement to answer
a wrong against persons with an equivalent or fitting deprivation against the
wrongdoer. Even if it were possible to imprison a corporation, or flog it, or stop
its heart, such a punishment could not be retributive.
Punishment of corporations can, of course, cause people to suffer or endure
setbacks that they might deserve. But individuals can deserve to be punished only
in proportion to their own wrongdoing. One individual cannot be a justified
retributive object on account of others’ wrongdoing simply because of a legalinstitutional relationship among them—as opposed, for example, to being
responsible on account of the individual’s culpable complicity in the wrongdoing
of others. And, of course, individuals affiliated with a corporation may deserve
some blame if something goes wrong in the firm, even if their individual
blameworthiness is insufficient to justify official punishment.
Some argue for corporate retributivism on the grounds that (1) corporations
can be blameworthy; (2) people believe that blameworthy corporations deserve

3. See infra notes 23–43 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., KIP SCHLEGEL, JUST DESERTS FOR CORPORATE CRIMINALS 75–90 (1990); Samuel
W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473, 491–500 (2006) (including
sources cited therein).
5. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis
of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 692 (1997); Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially
Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 834 (1994); see also Reinier H.
Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 858 (1984);
Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between Enterprise and Personal Liability
for Accidents, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1345, 1346 (1982); Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability,
93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1231 (1984).
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to be punished; so (3) corporations should be punished in order to deliver on a
justified demand for corporate desert. These are obviously consequentialist
arguments. If retribution against corporations cannot actually be achieved,
corporate punishment must be delivering something else in response to the
understandable demand for corporate desert. That something may be socially
beneficial. But it is not retributive.
While this argument, to be developed in what follows, echoes the aphorism
that a corporation has “no soul to damn, no body to kick,”6 the old metaphor—
which has been deployed, often confusingly, to support a diversity of arguments
about corporate punishment—does not capture the point. The state has many
means by which to damn and kick corporations, that is, means by which to make
a corporation’s affairs go less well in response to its conduct, including by
damaging or even destroying a corporation’s identity or existence. Corporate
punishment is no difficulty.7
The problem is that a corporation, however much it may be affected by the
damning and kicking, cannot be made to endure the punishment in a way that
would count as retributive. For legal entities, pain, setbacks, suffering, hard
treatment, and loss of well-being are only (ill-fitting) synonyms for losses. As with
tangos, it takes two to retribute: For retribution to occur, it must be both
delivered and received—and its receipt must occur in the requisite morally
significant way, not through a solely instrumental process (one that applies
measures to a subject designed to induce behavioral alterations). The apposite
metaphor would perhaps be something far less felicitous, like “a corporation has
no psyche at which to direct deprivation.”
It follows that if corporations cannot receive retribution, there can be no
retributive constraint on corporate punishment. Thus, any prohibitions on
“unjust” corporate punishments must arise from either instrumental analysis or
some other theory, perhaps one about fairness and procedural rights, establishing
why it would be wrong to punish a corporation that did not engage in culpable
wrongdoing.
The developed form of this argument will, it is hoped, illuminate aspects of
the contemporary corporate prosecution program in the United States, as
administered by the Department of Justice (DOJ). Since 1999, the DOJ has
published and pursued a thoroughgoingly instrumentalist program for imposing
corporate criminal liability.8 In large part because of that program’s close focus

6. See Eliezer Lederman, Criminal Law, Perpetrator and Corporation: Rethinking a Complex
Triangle, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 285, 309 (1985) (quoting R. CROSS & P. JONES,
INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL LAW 122 (R. Card ed., 10th ed. 1984)).
7. W. Robert Thomas, The Ability and Responsibility of Corporate Law to Improve Criminal Fines,
78 OHIO ST. L.J. 601, 624 (2017) (“Corporations obviously can be harmed, and plausibly can experience
harm: they can have their charters to exist revoked, their property seized, or their internal structures
forcibly reworked in ways that severely impair the corporation from pursuing its goals.”); see SCHLEGEL,
supra note 4, at 147–73. Thomas uses the word “experience,” but it is not clear whether he means
something like “be affected by” or rather “feel.”
8. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual, § 9-28.000 (2018).
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on questions of social welfare—and the manner in which social welfare analysis
of corporate affairs tends to be conducted in the United States—prosecutors have
developed a practice of commonly negotiating and settling with corporations.9
Much of the public and the media has been dissatisfied with this corporate
prosecution program, some intensely so.10 There are a variety of objections to the
DOJ’s conduct, often including cogent suggestions for reform. But, among the
voices of dissent, there is a common and simple theme that the government
“keeps letting corporations off the hook,” and the like.
This objection should not be surprising. Whether or not the DOJ is punishing
corporations enough, and in the right ways, to achieve beneficial changes in
corporate behavior, prosecutors are not delivering desert upon corporations—
because they could not do so even if that were their objective. In a simple way,
this is true because the doctrine that federal prosecutors deploy against
corporations, respondeat superior liability, imposes a broad form of agency
liability on companies that requires no inquiry into corporate institutional fault.
But the theoretical deficit in retributive corporate punishment, in a deeper way,
means that corporate prosecutions cannot accomplish retributive punishment
regardless of the applicable liability rule.
A puzzle is thus partially illuminated. It has remained mysterious why
corporate criminal liability is so attractive to both the public and officials even
though the only remedy that criminal justice systems can impose on
corporations—that American-style civil process cannot—is to convict them, that
is, to declare them guilty of a crime.11 Indeed, a great deal of the unhappiness
with the DOJ’s program is that prosecutors most often settle cases through
deferred prosecution and nonprosecution agreements (DPAs and NPAs) that are
said to coddle corporations because, in such deals, firms avoid criminal
conviction.
But why should a conviction by itself matter, given that it is only an entry on
a court’s docket?12 Perhaps convictions matter because they are the most public
and official way to say that a corporation deserves to be punished, even though
9. See generally BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE
WITH CORPORATIONS (2014); Jennifer Arlen & Samuel W. Buell, The Law of Corporate Investigations
and the Global Expansion of Corporate Criminal Enforcement, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 697 (2020).
10. See, e.g., JESSE EISINGER, THE CHICKENSHIT CLUB: WHY THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT FAILS
PROSECUTE EXECUTIVES (2017); Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level
Executives Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/
2014/01/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/ [https://perma.cc/RYZ8-M7MK]; David M.
Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements and the Erosion of Corporate Criminal
Liability, 72 MD. L. REV. 1295, 1301 (2013); see also SAMUEL W. BUELL, CAPITAL OFFENSES: BUSINESS
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA’S CORPORATE AGE 109–75 (2016) (assessing such claims in
depth).
11. See V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does it Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV.
1477, 1532 (1996) (arguing that corporate civil liability could replace corporate criminal liability).
12. See Cindy R. Alexander & Jennifer Arlen, Does Conviction Matter? The Reputational and
Collateral Effects of Corporate Crime, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE CRIME AND
FINANCIAL MISDEALING 87, 91 (Jennifer Arlen ed., 2018) (finding that guilty pleas and deferred
prosecution agreements impact firms similarly).
TO
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it cannot actually receive its desert in the form of a sentence. “We declare this
group project worthy of blame even though, alas, we cannot make it endure
retribution for its wrong.” Such a statement may be warranted and accurate, and
may have useful effects. It is also an admission of the impossibility of corporate
retribution.
In the remainder of this Article these arguments are expanded, first by
distinguishing several lines of retributive argument, then by applying those
arguments to corporations, and finally by showing how common claims about
what is often called corporate “retribution” actually serve the mainstream and
dominant discussion of consequentialism, and particularly instrumentalism, in
corporate punishment.
II
THE ARGUMENT FROM THEORY
To claim that there can be no retributive punishment of corporations because
non-persons (or “merely” legal persons) cannot be objects of retribution is, of
course, conclusory. And an assertion such as that a corporation has “no soul to
damn” is not grounded in modern retributive theory, which works with reason,
not spiritual belief. This Part summarizes the particular claims of retributive
theory in order to set the stage for further examining the application of that
theory to corporations.
A. Retribution
The simplest and most common way to state the theory of retribution, as a
general justifying aim of the criminal law, is in terms of a moral imperative that
wrongdoers deserve punishment on account of their wrongdoing.13 This major
premise of retributivism can frustrate some because it seems so abrupt, even a
touch circular. But the full-throated retributivist (sometimes termed the
“positive” retributivist) does not see it that way. For her, the theory, at the level
of first principle, is elegant for its simplicity and clarity.
With the concession that the particulars of retributivist theory continue to be
debated at enormous length, we might parse the major premise into three
elements.14 First, there must be wrongdoing committed by a wrongdoer—
opening the way to rich debate about what moral wrongs are, and which ones
warrant designation as crimes.15 Next is the question of why moral wrongdoing
produces, in Joel Feinberg’s formulation, a “desert basis,” such that punishment
of the wrongdoer should or must follow from her wrongdoing—and why the state
13. See MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 153–
59 (1997); Michael S. Moore, Justifying Retributivism, 27 ISR. L. REV. 15, 15 (1993).
14. For a full and clear discussion of the main issues in retributive theory and the leading literatures,
see Alec Walen, Retributive Justice, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., https://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/justice-retributive/ [https://perma.cc/5998-BJ22].
15. See, e.g., DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 14
(2008).
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should be the one to impose it.16 Third is the question of what desert demands be
done to the wrongdoer on account of her wrongdoing.17
Across each of these three questions, the major premise holds. Retribution,
when demanded, is pursued in order to fulfill a moral imperative—that the
wrongdoer must be punished. Whether such punishment produces benefits or
harms is irrelevant to a “pure” or “full-throated” retributive theory. One can
style retributivism as a broadly consequentialist theory by including the good of
satisfying retributivism’s moral imperative within the desirable products of
punishment.18 But that is the only sense in which retributive theory can be said to
look forward.
For many, an entailment of retributive theory is what is commonly known as
“negative” retributivism, sometimes referred to as retributivism’s “side
constraint” on consequentialism.19 On this view, it is also (or instead) a moral
imperative that wrongdoers never be punished in excess of their desert. Thus, no
matter how great the social benefits of a given punishment might be, any
imposition of such punishment on a non-wrongdoer is a prohibited moral wrong.
To consider, at a categorical level, the application of retributive punishment
to corporations, we need not grapple with the question of what may count as
moral wrongdoing deserving of punishment. The present subject is punishment
of corporations for any crime, not which actions, among all those a corporation
might take, should be criminalized.
Neither need we dwell on the question of why wrongdoing produces a desert
demand—the fulcrum of retributive theory. The objective here is not to reargue
the central claim of retributivism, but to assume it. If a corporation can be a
wrongdoer, then retributivism demands that the state deliver desert to the
corporation on account of its wrongdoing. To fail to pursue desert would be to
defy retributivism’s command. Whether, for example, such desert is required in
order to “balance the moral ledger,” simply because it is morally good to do what
is morally required, or for some other reason, are debated matters of retributive
theory that are not material to the question of whether corporations can be
punished retributively.20
What desert demands be done to the wrongdoer on account of her
wrongdoing, however, is the central question in considering corporate

16. JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 58
(1970); David Dolinko, Retributivism, Consequentialism, and the Intrinsic Goodness of Punishment, 16
LAW & PHIL. 507, 508 (1997); Alon Harel, Why Only the State May Inflict Criminal Sanctions: The Case
Against Privately Inflicted Sanctions, 14 LEGAL THEORY 113, 114 2008).
17. See Michael T. Cahill, Retributive Justice in the Real World, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 815, 825–42
(2007).
18. Berman, Two Kinds of Retributivism, supra note 2, at 339–40; see also Moore, supra note 13, at
19 (“[W]hat is distinctively retributivist is the view that the guilty receiving their just deserts is an intrinsic
good. It is, in other words, not an instrumental good.”).
19. R.A. Duff, Penal Communications: Recent Work in the Philosophy of Punishment, 20 CRIME &
JUST. 1, 7 (1996).
20. Id. at 26–28.
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retribution. “Punishment” is not an easily defined term.21 It tends to represent a
category of things more than a clearly specified concept. What counts as
punishment depends on many things, not least the purpose or purposes for which
the action denoted as punishment is carried out. In Joel Feinberg’s oft-quoted
formulation, punishment is the unique coupling of official sanctions with official
condemnation: “Punishment is a conventional device for the expression of
attitudes of resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and
reprobation, either on the part of the punishing authority himself or those ‘in
whose name’ the punishment is inflicted.”22 Of course, there can be no expression
of condemnation without the infliction of the punishment that does the
expressing.
To say that retributivism demands that wrongdoers be punished on account
of their wrongdoing invites the question of what it is that must be done to
wrongdoers in order for it to be said that they have been punished. What is it
exactly that wrongdoers deserve?
A rough count would likely reveal the most common view in the modern
literature to be that retribution requires the infliction of suffering.23 As Rawls put
it, “It is morally fitting that a person who does wrong should suffer in proportion
to his wrongdoing.”24 The terms “hard treatment” and “pain” are also sometimes
used in addition to or in place of suffering.25 These ideas amount to the same
thing: that to punish a person retributively is to set out to make her endure a
treatment or process designed and intended to be difficult or unpleasant to
endure. Since corporal punishment is not used in Anglo-American legal systems,
these treatments now generally take the form of deprivations, most commonly
deprivation of liberties and comforts.
Along this line of retributive analysis, a debate that has followed has been
described, in an oversimplification, as between “objectivists” and
“subjectivists.”26 Objectivists, one might summarize, maintain that the desert
21. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401,
405 (1958) (defining punishment as “unpleasant physical consequences” plus condemnation).
22. Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 MONIST 397, 400 (1965).
23. FEINBERG, supra note 16, at 67 (“It is an essential and intended element of punishment . . .
that the victim be made to suffer.”); Moore, supra note 13, at 21 (“[O]nly when harsh treatment is
imposed on offenders in order to give them their just deserts does such harsh treatment constitute
punishment.”); see also JOHN KLEINIG, PUNISHMENT AND DESERT 67 (1973); Berman, Two Kinds of
Retributivism, supra note 2, at 438; A.M. Quinton, On Punishment, 14 ANALYSIS 133, 136–37 (1954);
Douglas N. Husak, Retribution in Criminal Theory, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 959, 960 (2000). Some would
substitute “pain” for suffering as the object of retribution, but this amounts to the same point. See NILS
CHRISTIE, LIMITS TO PAIN 5 (1981); K.G. Armstrong, The Retributivist Hits Back, 70 MIND 471, 473
(1961) (defining punishment as “the deliberate infliction of pain”).
24. John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 4–5 (1955).
25. For example, Schlegel, in a frequently cited monograph defending the idea of corporate
retribution, says that corporations may be given “hard treatment” and “vary greatly in their capacity to
endure hard treatment,” without argument as to how this vocabulary suits corporate subjects. SCHLEGEL,
supra note 4, at 153 (emphasis added).
26. See John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan Masur, Happiness and Punishment, 76
U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1069 (2009) (arguing that retributivism needs to account for individual responses

02 - BUELL - RETIRING CORPORATE RETRIBUTION - AUTHOR PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

32

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

12/19/2020 11:47 AM

[Vol. 83:25

demand is that the state carry out the required punishment, and that ends the
matter. If the wrongdoer for some reason welcomes the punishment, is
indifferent to it, or does not experience it, that does not negate retribution—as
long as the punishment imposed is the one that retribution demands, and the
wrongdoer at least has the capacity to be punished even if he does not in fact
experience the punishment in the modally expected manner.27
Subjectivists, on the other hand, maintain that retribution requires that the
wrongdoer’s suffering or experience be the designed one in each instance of
punishment. Indeed, some argue that an individual wrongdoer’s suffering is the
essence of the punishment that retribution demands and that the state’s actions
to bring about that suffering are not the punishment itself but rather its
instrument.28
Much of this debate has been concerned with whether it matters that people
commonly experience equivalent punishments differently.29 For example, if
suffering is what retribution demands in the way of punishment, should
punishments be imposed, as in current practice, “objectively” in terms of, for
example, years in prison, or “subjectively,” in terms of something like units of
suffering, calculated according to the individual wrongdoer’s liability to suffer
from a particular form of punishment.
Some have described retribution as requiring a less overtly affective form of
deprivation, such as a set-back to interests or well-being.30 As Mitchell Berman
has put the point, desert demands (considerations of proportionality aside) that
the wrongdoer’s life “go less well” as a consequence of her wrongdoing.31 Or, if
one is concerned about the question of subjectivity addressed in the debate just
described, at least that the state imposes a punishment that is expected or
intended to make the wrongdoer’s life go less well.

to punishment); David Gray, Punishment as Suffering, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1619, 1624–25 (2010); Adam J.
Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 182, 184 (2009) (arguing that
accounting for subjective experience is necessary in justifying punishment); Dan Markel & Chad
Flanders, Bentham on Stilts: The Bare Relevance of Subjectivity to Retributive Justice, 98 CALIF. L. REV.
907, 909 (2010) (arguing that subjective variations do not matter greatly to retributivism).
27. Markel & Flanders, supra note 26, at 941.
28. Kolber, supra note 26, at 218; Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 26, at 1069–70.
29. Gray, supra note 26, at 1623; Kolber, supra note 26, at 184; Adam J. Kolber, Unintentional
Punishment, 18 LEGAL THEORY 1, 6 (2012); Kenneth W. Simons, Retributivists Need Not and Should
Not Endorse the Subjectivist Account of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 1, 2 (2009); see also
David Lewis, The Punishment that Leaves Something to Chance, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 53, 59–63 (1989)
(in examining the “moral luck” problem in how to punish attempts, stating that many aspects of how
punishment differentially affects individuals necessarily creates a kind of “punishment lottery”).
30. For discussion of the connection between desert and well-being, see SHELLY KAGAN, Moral
Desert, in THE GEOMETRY OF DESERT 3–17 (2012).
31. Mitchell N. Berman, Rehabilitating Retributivism, 32 LAW & PHIL. 83, 87 (2013) [hereinafter
Berman, Rehabilitating Retributivism]. Indeed, for Berman the intentional infliction of suffering is the
essential fact about punishment that gives rise to the requirement that punishment be justified, and thus
to the grounds for all general theories of punishment. Mitchell N. Berman, Punishment and Justification,
118 ETHICS 258, 266 (2008).
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Without grounding a theory of retributive punishment in suffering, set-backs
to interests or well-being, or other forms of deprivation, it is difficult to construct
a distinctive and persuasive account of what it is that punishment must do in order
to count as retributive. As soon as one begins to talk about making the wrongdoer
think about her wrong, or change her behavior, or the like, one strays into the
realm of mainstream instrumentalist punishment theory (reform and
rehabilitation, specific deterrence, and the like).32
Consider lines of theoretical argument that describe the purposes of
punishment as more communicative than painful. Some who have been called
“expressive retributivists” assert that “condemnation, instead of or in addition to
hard treatment, is what the wrongdoer deserves.”33 Others who have been called,
not always with precision, expressive theorists of punishment describe
punishment as communicating the victim’s moral worth in relation to that of the
offender (Jean Hampton, for example); as communicating to the offender the
nature and implications of her offense so that she will internalize the moral
matter (Antony Duff, for example); as speaking the morally true “language of
condemnation, censure, and vindication” in response to crime’s false “language
of dishonor and disrespect” (Stephen Garvey); or as communicating “certain
messages of condemnation through coercive sanctions to the person most in need
of hearing these messages: the offender” (Dan Markel).34
Arguments such as these, based in the production of communicative effects,
do not succeed in removing the necessity of actually or potentially experienced
deprivation from the retributive punishment equation. These arguments are
consequentialist, in the broad sense, in their concern with not only conveying
meaning but having meaning internalized. In any event, they depend on the
possibility of an affective subject of punishment, to whom condemnatory and
similar messages can have meaning, and particularly meaning with impact on the
subject’s emotions, beliefs, and self-understanding.35

32. FEINBERG, supra note 16, at 81 (“Utility is not a desert basis for any deserved mode of treatment
. . . to say ‘S deserves X because giving it to him would be in the public interest’ is simply to misuse the
word ‘deserves.’”); see also Kip Schlegel, Desert, Retribution, and Corporate Criminality, 5 JUST. Q. 615,
617–26 (carefully disentangling arguments about corporate punishment to distinguish retributive from
consequentialist claims) (1988).
33. Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363,
1421 (2000).
34. Id. at 1422–27; Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801, 1820–21
(1999); Dan Markel, Retributive Justice and the Demands of Democratic Citizenship, 1 VA. J. CRIM. L. 1,
25–26 (2012).
35. See, e.g., Garvey, supra note 34, at 1838 (explaining how Moore’s theory of retribution asks us
to consider how the ideal serious offender would feel guilty and deserving of suffering and apply that
desert to the question of how to treat the actual offender—to which Garvey adds the claim that the ideal
offender would also desire to atone); Markel, supra note 34, at 28 (“By imposing the punishment upon a
competent offender, we are able to communicate to him (and also express to others) our commitment to
certain specific values of political morality.”); Markel & Flanders, supra note 26, at 910 (“[A] person
selected for punishment must be a fit interlocutor for the communicative message of retributive
punishment.”); Gideon Rosen, The Alethic Conception of Moral Responsibility, in THE NATURE OF
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY: NEW ESSAYS 65, 82 (Randolph Clarke et al. eds., 2015) (“[W]hat resentment
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Some who have pursued retributive theory along these communicative lines,
including Jean Hampton, have said that suffering through punishment is the
mechanism by which the relevant retributive goal is pursued.36 Even if one would
deny the necessity of punishment as suffering in favor of, for example, Dan
Markel’s idea of punishment “as an attempt to communicate to the offender
society’s condemnation by means of an objective good such as liberty,” one must
explain how deprivations of this sort can count as “punishment” other than due
to the deprivation involved in enduring them.37
If one instead maintains that retributivism requires that a proportionate
punishment be imposed on grounds such as “to balance the moral ledger,” “to
answer one wrong with another,” as a matter of distributive fairness, as
condemning the moral wrong of social free-riding, or the like, one does not quite
reach the bottom of the matter.38 How is it that punishment of a wrongdoer could
be equated with a wrong or serve to balance the weight of that wrong on a moral
scale? Only by being a wrong of some sort itself. What kind of wrong could
punishment be, if one sets aside matters of social costs and benefits? None other
than the infliction of a deprivation upon the offender that must be “suffered,”
even if it does not lead to actual suffering.
Without at least the potential of the offender’s experience of deprivation,
there could be no moral wrong to answer the wrongdoer’s wrong. And as Jean
Hampton argues, a “free rider” or “distributive justice” theory of retribution that
justifies punishment as ensuring the fair allocation of benefits and burdens across
society fails to account for retribution with the worst crimes, ones for which
almost no non-offender would feel any cost in refraining from committing the
crime.39 (When Hampton asserts that “retribution is actually a form of
compensation to the victim,” her theory similarly leaves a gap with respect to
crimes based on diffused theories of victimization—a particularly common
phenomenon in corporate crime.40)

wants is not simply that the agent suffer, but that she suffer in recognizing what she has done, in being
brought face to face with the harm that she has caused or risked, the disrespect she showed, and so on.”).
36. Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS
AND MERCY 111, 123 (1988).
37. Markel & Flanders, supra note 26, at 911. Markel and Flanders appear to concede this. Id. at
946 (“[T]he goal is not to cause the offender unvariegated suffering, but to communicate to the offender
the wrongness of his action, using particular deprivations to signal that condemnation.”).
38. See, e.g., Andrew Ashworth, Criminal Attempts and the Role of Resulting Harm under the Code,
and in the Common Law, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 725, 735–36 (1988); Hampton, supra note 36, at 125–26;
Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475, 477 (1968); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Retributivism,
Moral Education, and the Liberal State, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Winter/Spring 1985, at 3, 6–7; see also Duff,
supra note 19, at 26–27 (summarizing such arguments and their critics).
39. Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA
L. REV. 1659, 1660 (1992); see Morris, supra note 38, at 477–78. An additional problem with the
application of Morris’ retributive theory to corporations is that he argues in terms of the offender’s
“right” to be treated as a moral agent by receiving his desert. When we speak about any rights of
corporations, we speak about legal and procedural rights, not human rights.
40. Hampton, supra note 39, at 1698.
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Retributive punishment therefore requires at least the potential for a
wrongdoer to endure deprivation.41 As a corollary, there can be no “negative”
retributivist objection to excess punishment where there can be no such
experience to endure. Thus, in the absence of wrongdoers’ experiential capacity,
punishment can neither be justified nor restrained on the basis of retributivist
argument.
B. Corporate Wrongdoing
Probably the most common objection to punishing corporations on the basis
of retributive justifications is, in general terms, that corporations are not people
and therefore cannot be blameworthy.42 This claim—that corporations
categorically lack moral agency—runs contrary to widespread social practice and
is not persuasive.
Start with the question of what is required in order to have a blameworthy
subject in terms of punishment theory, that is, a wrongdoer deserving of
punishment. There must be an act and the act must be morally wrong in one or
more ways sufficient to justify criminal punishment.43 Corporations, as
phenomena in the world, plainly do things—that is, produce outcomes—some of
which are deeply concerning on dimensions such as harm and risk that amply
justify discussion about legal response.44 Indeed, we live in a world pervaded by
the activities of corporations as well as laws and legal procedures that are
responsive to those activities.
To argue that “corporate acts” are not a distinct phenomenon from the
individual actions of the people (some of them often independently blameworthy
as wrongdoers, but many of them frequently not so) whose behavior contributed
41. It is an interesting question whether people can be made to endure deprivations when they are
no longer alive, as in the situation of posthumous harm to reputation. See Ben Bradley, Well-Being and
Death, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF WELL-BEING 320, 325–326 (Guy Fletcher
ed., 2016) (discussing the possibility of posthumous harm to a person’s well-being). I do not see this
problem as having implications for theories of corporate punishment. Any theory of posthumous effects
on well-being would seem to depend on the subject having once lived.
42. Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the Punishment of Corporations, 46 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1359, 1373 (2009) (“The word ‘criminal’ has its distinctive significance, however, because this
word means blameworthy. Someone who applies this word to objects and entities that are not
blameworthy uses the label falsely.”).
43. See Hampton, supra note 39, at 1662 (“A wrongful harm or loss only comes from wrongful
conduct by an agent thought to be culpable.”); Husak, supra note 23, at 983 (“[A] state of affairs cannot
be identified as a harm (in the relevant sense) without reference to morality. Conduct produces harm to
others when it infringes their rights. Therefore, conduct that does not infringe anyone’s rights, however
unwanted or undesirable it may be, simply does not cause harm in the sense that renders it eligible for
proscription. For each of these reasons, a harm theorist, no less than a legal moralist, requires a
conception of morality to get his theory of criminalization off the ground.”); William S. Laufer & Alan
Strudler, Corporate Intentionality, Desert, and Variants of Vicarious Liability, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1285,
1290 (2000) (“Paradigmatically, one deserves punishment only for engaging in a wrongful act while
having a relevant culpable state of mind.”).
44. See Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1481, 1483–84 (2009) (“Modern corporations not only wield virtually unprecedented power, but
they do so in a fashion that often causes serious harm to both individuals and to society as a whole.”).

02 - BUELL - RETIRING CORPORATE RETRIBUTION - AUTHOR PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

36

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

12/19/2020 11:47 AM

[Vol. 83:25

to the corporate act is not persuasive. Furthermore, it is not material to doctrine
whether one calls this problem one of “action,” “corporate acts,” or “collective
actions,” or whether this problem matches the way traditional criminal law
doctrine deals with the “act requirement.” Law has developed functional tools
for ascribing the results of collective activity within corporations to corporate
entities, including agency doctrines such as respondeat superior that control in
both criminal prosecutions and many civil actions.45
Acts can be ascribed to corporations, and it makes perfect sense to do so.
Modern industrial society would be unintelligible without a coherent moral and
linguistic framework for attributing the oil spill to the energy company, the
overdose deaths to the pharmaceutical firm, the defective air bag to the
automobile parts manufacturer, and so on.46 Of course these events result from
the actions of individual persons. But they can be coherently described, much less
occur as they do, only if there is such a phenomenon as group action (the whole)
distinct from a collection of individual actions (the sum of the parts).47 Anyone
who has spent time studying scandals, compliance, corporate culture,
management, and corporate governance would agree that it is sophistic to
maintain that corporations do not act because they are not people.
In retributive theory, action alone is not sufficient to justify criminal liability.
Actions must be morally wrong to warrant punishment. Some might argue that
actions themselves can be sufficiently morally wrong to warrant punishment in
the absence of culpability—that some instances of the law punishing on the basis
of strict liability are not just means of influencing behavior but also of blaming
for the imposition of serious harms. But that would be an uncommon view.48 As
a matter of both positive and negative retributivism, it is generally agreed that

45. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R., Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 492–93 (1909); United
States v. Dye Constr. Co., 510 F.2d 78, 82 (10th Cir. 1975); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 (AM.
LAW INST., Official Draft 1985); Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 370–71
(2003).
46. See Brent Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault, and
Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1141, 1149 (1982) (“When people blame corporations . . . they are
condemning the fact that people within the organization collectively failed to avoid the offense to which
corporate blame attaches.”).
47. See PETER CANE, RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW AND MORALITY 41–42 (2002) (examining “[t]he
importance of concepts of group legal responsibility”); D.E. Cooper, Collective Responsibility, in
COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY: FIVE DECADES OF DEBATE IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ETHICS
35, 35–36 (Larry May & Stacey Hoffman eds., 1991) (describing “Collective Responsibility” and
“Individual Responsibility” as distinct concepts); CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY 112, 144–45, 192
(2000) (discussing the relationship between collective action and individual action); LARRY MAY, THE
MORALITY OF GROUPS 65 (1987) (arguing that corporate organization and procedures “combine and
change the intentional states of key members of the organization so as to result in purposive behavior for
the group”); LARRY MAY, SHARING RESPONSIBILITY 75 (1992) [hereinafter MAY, SHARING
RESPONSIBILITY] (stating that individuals “act differently in groups than they would on their own” due
to the relationships between group members).
48. Even a strongly “harm-based” (as opposed to “intent-based”) account of moral responsibility,
see Ashworth, supra note 38, at 735–36, depends at least implicitly on a conception of how it is that one
deserves to be blamed for the hurt one’s actions cause others, a conception that must include some
account of the harm-doer’s failings as a moral agent capable of deliberation.
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there must be moral blameworthiness in an action to justify punishment, and that
blameworthiness generally follows from cognitive culpability, that is, from the
beliefs, attitudes, or choices that gave rise to the actions in question.49 Without
sufficient blameworthiness in the form of morally faulty cognition, there can be
no desert of punishment.
This is where arguments against corporate retributivism have usually staked
their claim. Independent of questions involving the doctrinal particulars of mens
rea, punishment theory generally holds that morally wrongful choice (a decision
to impose unjustified harm or risk of harm on another, for example) is the type
of culpability that is necessary to any argument for blameworthiness.50 This
condition can be stated in various ways, but that is a serviceable approximation
of what modern punishment theory has established in place of, or to build upon,
the criminal law’s ancient requirement of “general mens rea,” or what is
sometimes called the Blackstonian idea of an “evil” or “wicked” mind.”51
The most common argument one hears against corporate retributivism is that
corporations do not have minds, so cannot make wrongful choices, and thus
cannot be morally blameworthy.52 Corporations therefore cannot deserve
punishment. As with the question of corporate action, the problem is theoretical,
not doctrinal. The law of corporate criminal liability has a number of options for
locating corporate mens rea, including of course the vicarious liability approach
of respondeat superior doctrine followed by federal law in the U.S. The doctrinal
problem has produced a lively and still productive literature,53 but that debate is
about implementation.
The question prior to doctrine is whether it is coherent to blame a corporation
for the “choices” it makes when corporate actions, at least in cases involving firms
of any substantial size, are the product of the thinking and deliberations of
multiple persons. An affirmative answer is straightforwardly established in three
steps.54
49. E.g., Larry Alexander & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Culpable Acts of Risk Creation, 5 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 375, 377–379 (2008); MOORE, supra note 13, at 191–93; Moore, supra note 26, at 30, 41–42.
50. See supra note 49.
51. See United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F. Supp. 485, 494 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (referring to the
historical requirement of an “evil intent” in criminal law); see also Kahler v. Kansas, 240 S.Ct. 1021, 1039–
45 (2020) (Breyer, J, dissenting) (arguing that, based on historical evidence, “[a] defendant who, due to
mental illness, lacks sufficient mental capacity to be held morally responsible for his actions cannot be
found guilty of a crime”).
52. E.g., Manuel G. Velasquez, Why Corporations Are Not Morally Responsible for Anything They
Do, 2 BUS. & PRO. ETHICS J. 1, 12 (1983) (“All that a corporation’s members should have to suffer is the
blame and punishment consequent on their own moral responsibility; to make them suffer the
punishment that should have been levied on the corporate structure would be to punish them twice. But
in fact it is not possible to impose blame or punishment upon an organizational structure without having
that blame or punishment fall on the shoulders of the corporation’s members . . . . These members are
therefore being unjustly forced to bear the punishment for another entity’s moral responsibility.”).
53. See, e.g., Andrew Weissmann & David Newman, Rethinking Corporate Criminal Liability, 82
IND. L.J. 411 (2007).
54. For a book-length development of the argument, see CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILIP PETTIT, GROUP
AGENCY: THE POSSIBILITY, DESIGN, AND STATUS OF CORPORATE AGENTS (2011).
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First, if collective human decision making is an actual phenomenon—which
seems incontrovertible—then it is coherent to ascribe responsibility to groups for
bad decisions. Second, group responsibility is a distinct phenomenon from
individual responsibility, that is, one communicates something different or
additional when one blames a group for a wrong decision than when one blames
members of that group for making wrong decisions or having a role in the group
decision. Third, if group blame is warranted, then it is sensible, in an instance of
group decision making within a corporation, to select the corporation as the
object of that blame.55
Perhaps the last point is the most debatable of the three. But—except maybe
in exceptional corporate cases—it would be hard to find a better representation
of the group than the corporation, just as one would point to the gang, the family,
the team, the clique, the band, and the like, for blame in other group contexts. In
other words, it would be odd, in a case of blameworthy group decision making
within a corporation, to say something like, “Well any legal blame must be
directed at the corporation because it is the only legal person in this picture other
than the individuals, but moral blame really belongs with a different, non-legal
entity like ‘the people who work at the corporation.’”
Thus, the widespread contemporary social practice of blaming corporations
for producing wrongs is analytically sound.56 If retributive theory cannot be
applied coherently to corporations, it is not because corporations cannot be
blameworthy and thus deserving of punishment.
C. Corporate Punishment
It is at the point of punishment—the deliverance of what is deserved—that
retributivism loses purchase on corporate criminality. Joel Feinberg, in his
famous theorizing of the concept of desert, puts the matter thusly:
What are the various kinds of treatment that persons deserve from other persons? They
are varied, but they have at least one thing in common: they are generally “affective” in
character, that is, favored or disfavored, pursued or avoided, pleasant or unpleasant.
The deserved object must be something generally regarded with favor or disfavor even
if, in some particular case, it is regarded with indifference by a person said to deserve it.
If we were all perfect stoics, if no event were ever more or less pleasing to us than any
other, there would be no use for the concept of desert.57

Or, as Mitchell Berman puts it:
[T]o a rough first approximation, what wrongdoers deserve on account of their
wrongdoing is that their lives go less well. To a second pass . . . [a]n individual who
engages in wrongdoing deserves that her life go less well than it otherwise would have

55. See id. at 153–63 (expanding on the argument that “we have every reason to hold group agents
responsible” for their actions, not just the individuals that compose those groups).
56. For extended argument in support of both this claim and the general proposition of group
responsibility, see the ample legal and philosophical literatures. E.g., CANE, supra note 47; Benjamin
Ewing, The Structure of Tort Law, Revisited: The Problem of Corporate Responsibility, 8 J. TORT L. 1,
20–28 (2015) (discussing how corporations can be morally and attributively responsible for torts); KUTZ,
supra note 47; LIST & PETTIT, supra note 54; MAY, SHARING RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 47.
57. FEINBERG, supra note 16, at 61.
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gone, and less well in proportion to the blameworthiness of her wrongdoing, and that
she understands that it goes less well as a consequence of her wrongdoing.58

This is where the idea that “corporations are not people” causes punishment
theory constructed for the problem of punishing individuals to fail when applied
to corporations.59 In terms of the discussion described above, if a corporation
cannot experience hardship because it is not a sentient being—either actually or
in any analogous way that could accommodate the concept of enduring painful
or unwelcome treatment—then it does not matter whether one is an “objectivist”
or a “subjectivist” about retributive punishment. Corporations do not experience
pain or suffering differentially or occasionally. They simply do not feel anything.
One might assert that while corporations cannot experience pain, they are
projects that can go well or poorly in the world depending in part on what is done
to them, including by the state. Thus, one might say, corporations can deserve to
have their affairs go less well and their affairs can be made to go less well as a
consequence of this desert.
In terms of the discussion of retributive theory above, one can, at a first pass,
plausibly say that corporations can have their interests set back. Corporations,
after all, do have interests, at least legal and economic ones. In addition,
corporations can possibly have their well-being reduced—but only if the concept
of well-being applies to legal entities, a matter that well-being theory has not fully
addressed and that appears doubtful under the field’s more persuasive
conceptions of well-being, including even theories that do not depend on a
hedonic conception of well-being.60
But without affective capacity, a corporation can feel or experience nothing
when its affairs have gone less well, and thus in no sense can it be said that
retribution has been imposed, received, or even sensibly directed at the
corporation.61 Something major may have happened to the corporation that may
produce consequences, including instrumentally desirable ones. But at the point

58. Berman, Rehabilitating Retributivism, supra note 31, at 87–89.
59. See Alex Sarch, Skepticism About Corporate Punishment Revisited, in THE PALGRAVE
HANDBOOK OF APPLIED ETHICS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 213, 217 (Larry Alexander & Kimberly
Kessler Ferzan eds., 2019) (“Suppose we grant that in convicting and fining the corporation, we are not
engaging in real punishment. At best, it is a bad imitation of punishment—call it punishment*. Why is
this intrinsically bad? Assuming, as we are, that there are weighty consequentialist reasons for
punishment*, is conceptual confusion a substantial hurdle to adopting or continuing with that practice?”).
60. See, e.g., Willem van der Deijl, The Sentience Argument for Experientialism About Welfare, PHIL.
STUD. (2020), https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11098-020-01427-w.pdf [https://perma.cc/
37HL-4HBW] (concluding that “the most plausible and intuitive account suggests that all and only
sentient beings have wellbeing” and defining sentience as “the capacity to have phenomenological
consciousness, i.e., the capacity to have experiences”). See generally Stephen M. Campbell, The Concept
of Well-Being, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF WELL-BEING, supra note 41, at
402.
61. Interestingly, Jean Hampton, in one of her foundational writings on her original theory of
retribution, discusses its application to corporations (using the Ford Pinto scandal and litigation) as an
illustration of the theory of an offender’s low moral valuation of victims, without considering the question
of whether and how a corporation (Ford in this case) could be a subject of retributive treatment.
Hampton, supra note 39, at 1689.
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of punishment’s imposition, retribution has not occurred. Instead, punishment
has merely contributed to the sum of the inputs to a corporation’s existence that
determine how the institutional project will fare as it goes forward—in success,
failure, or mediocrity.62
This would hold true even if it were somehow possible to imprison a
corporation. From a retributive point of view, the problem is not that
corporations are too big to jail but rather that they are too inhuman to feel. To
cripple a corporation with, for example, a massive fine and to say, “Take that,
Acme Corp, you got what you deserved. How do you like them apples?” is no
more coherent than, after kicking the chair over which one has stumbled in the
night, telling the chair that the blow better have hurt. To use a different analogy,
attempting to mete out retribution to a corporation might be akin to carrying out
the death penalty for retributive reasons on a person who is insane and incapable
of understanding what is happening.63
A further implication of this analysis is that it makes no sense to talk about
negative retributivism with corporate punishment. Even in a predominantly
instrumental program of corporate punishment, retribution plays no logical role
in constraining such punishment.64 Of course, few who have explored corporate
retribution have done so out of worry about punishing corporations that are not
blameworthy. But there has been substantial discourse about the unfairness of
corporate criminal prosecutions with respect to certain individuals, especially
investors and employees (the so-called collateral consequences problem in
corporate crime). There may be good instrumental reasons to worry about effects
on such persons—as well as perhaps the sort of deontological worries that can be
relevant to thinking about the effects of criminal punishment on third parties such
as family members. As important as such considerations might be in the
corporate context, however, they do not implicate negative retributivism’s
concern with state imposition of undeserved deprivations on a subject of criminal
punishment.
III
THE ARGUMENT FROM POLITICS
What is left, then, of the idea of retribution as a justification for corporate
criminal liability? If one attends to public and political discourse about corporate
crime, as well to elements of the academic literature, one often hears versions of
the claim that blameworthy corporations should be punished with retribution in
mind because people, often very large portions of the population, correctly form

62. Cf. Markel & Flanders, supra note 26, at 932 (“[T]o punish someone is to say that flouting the
law cannot simply be fixed by compensation or an acknowledgement of causation alone.”).
63. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405–10 (1986) (holding that the Eighth Amendment bars
the imposition of the death penalty on an insane prisoner). Thanks to Kim Ferzan for raising this point.
64. See generally Michael T. Cahill, Retributive Justice in the Real World, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 815
(2007) (exploring the possible applications of retributive theory to the decisions of various actors at stages
of the criminal justice process).

02 - BUELL - RETIRING CORPORATE RETRIBUTION - AUTHOR PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 4 2020]

RETIRING CORPORATE RETRIBUTION

12/19/2020 11:47 AM

41

beliefs that corporations deserve punishment for their serious wrongs.65 Failing
to deliver that desert, on this claim, deprives people of something they have
demanded and are entitled to. Delivering it provides the public with satisfaction
that blameworthy corporations have received their due—which could be useful
in various ways, and could be the right thing to do regardless of whether doing so
produces benefits.66
In relation to the argument that imposing retribution on corporations is not
possible, this claim is a non sequitur rather than a rejoinder. No matter how
blameworthy a corporation might be, and no matter how strenuously the public
might maintain that a corporation deserves punishment as a result, if a
corporation cannot experience retribution, then retribution cannot be imposed.
The actual, and usually unarticulated, claim here is that punishing
corporations in the name of retribution—even if retributive punishment of
corporations is not possible—is instrumentally beneficial. This is an argument
that falls, roughly speaking, into a long line of scholarship concerned with the
utility of retribution and with the expressive function of criminal law.67 This rich
theoretical tradition dates at least to the work of James Fitzjames Stephen in the
nineteenth century. 68
This is a sensible line of argument, indeed one I have defended at length in
the context of corporate criminal liability.69 To truncate my own instrumental
version of this consequentialist line of argument, the practice of blaming legal
entities through criminal legal treatment can be a particularly potent way of
causing individuals engaged in group projects to internalize the significance and
origins of the most serious institutional failures and alter group conduct to reduce
future incidence of like failures.
Arguments in this tradition do not help establish the claim that corporate
prosecutions are justified on the grounds that they fulfill a retributive moral
imperative. Seeing this—and fully incorporating the point into the literature on
corporate crime—is much more than a matter of accuracy in terminology. It does
no great harm (except perhaps to the sensitivities of academic theorists) for
people to go around bemoaning the failure to adequately punish corporations for
their terrible moral awfulness, and so on. But it can do considerable harm to the
65. E.g., Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD.
609, 618–22 (1998).
66. See generally Mark Dsouza, Lessons from Analogising Natural and Corporate Persons in the
Criminal Law (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
67. E.g., Mark Dsouza, The Corporate Agent in Criminal Law: An Argument for Comprehensive
Identification, 79 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 91, 104 (“A criminal law that fails to assign labels that (at least
broadly) correspond to public perceptions lacks sociological legitimacy and public credibility, which are
amongst its main tools for guiding and modifying public behaviour.”).
68. 1 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 80–83
(London, MacMillan & Co. 1883); see also Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing
Corporate Misconduct, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., nos. 3–4, 1997, at 23, 39–40 (1997) (discussing
retributive theory in corporate criminal law).
69. Buell, supra note 4; see also Gregory M. Gilchrist, The Expressive Cost of Corporate Immunity,
64 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 48–55 (2012) (arguing for the expressive value of corporate punishment).
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urgent policy debate about corporate crime, and the connection of that debate to
useful theoretical work by scholars, for people to fail to follow through on the
meaning and significance of demands for corporate retribution.
Those demands, under scrutiny, should lead to more careful and thus more
useful analysis of what is to be accomplished through corporate criminal liability.
Otherwise, they are conclusory assertions—dead ends that can only stand in the
way of progress on matters of great public import and theoretical difficulty.
IV
CORPORATE PROSECUTIONS
So, what is it that corporate prosecutions do? This is of course a familiar
question for scholars. The foregoing analysis of the matter of the retributive
function in criminal punishment may help with the enduring search for clarity in
answering the question.
A. The Justice Department Program
On June 16, 1999, the DOJ for the first time consecrated its by then modern,
growing program of enforcing the doctrine of corporate criminal liability, a legal
rule that had been extant in American law for over a century. The founding
document was a memorandum titled “Bringing Criminal Charges Against
Corporations,” which attached a set of principles for “Federal Prosecution of
Corporations.”70 The memorandum was signed by then Deputy Attorney
General Eric Holder. It became known as the “Holder Memo,” but the
prosecution principles were enshrined in the Justice Manual, a quasi-regulatory
document that for many decades was known as the United States Attorneys
Manual.71
The DOJ has amended its principles for corporate prosecutions many times
since the Holder Memo.72 Some of those changes have substantially altered the
dynamics of investigation and settlement in corporate enforcement. The DOJ,
however, has never wavered from the foundational theory of corporate
prosecution set out in the introductory language of the Holder Memo: that the
prosecution of corporations can advance social welfare by helping to reduce the
incidence of corporate crime and that a federal prosecutor should assess whether
to charge a corporation based on a thorough balancing of the costs and benefits

70. Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Att’y Gen., to All Component Heads and U.S.
Att’ys on Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999), https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2010/04/11/charging-corps.PDF [https://perma.cc/58TE-FKSZ].
71. U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 8, §§ 9-28.000 et seq.
72. See Lawrence D. Finder & Ryan D. McConnell, Devolution of Authority: The Department of
Justice’s Corporate Charging Policies, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1 (2006) (outlining the evolution of DOJ
policies regarding corporate entities); Court E. Golumbic & Albert D. Lichy, The “Too Big to Jail” Effect
and the Impact of the Justice Department’s Corporate Charging Policy, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1293, 1301–12
(2014) (describing the DOJ’s changing use of deferred prosecution agreements in corporate
prosecutions).
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of prosecution.73 Other than references to vague concepts such as “the nature and
seriousness of the offense,” the DOJ’s policy does not explicitly direct
prosecutors to pursue the objective of corporate retribution.
In the two decades since the Holder Memo, the DOJ has developed a
thoroughgoingly instrumental program of corporate criminal enforcement. This
focus largely explains the development of DPAs and NPAs as the prevalent
means of resolving corporate criminal actions and the heavy outsourcing of the
investigative function to compliance operations and private lawyers working for
corporations.74
Criticisms of the DOJ’s enforcement program have been persistent
throughout the past two decades, and have grown in the wake of the financial
crisis of 2008. Indeed, Holder himself, when later serving as Attorney General in
the Obama Administration, sustained heavy media fire for his handling of
settlements with the large financial institutions that dominated the mortgagebacked securities industry.75
The lion’s share of criticism of the DOJ has been instrumentally oriented:
that, contrary to its aspirations, the DOJ is not achieving effective deterrence of
corporate crime because, for example, federal prosecutors fail to charge enough
(and senior enough) individuals, fail to impose sufficiently costly fines on
companies, and are unwilling to pursue corporate cases all the way to trial even
at the cost of potentially putting firms out of business.76 But an oft-repeated
theme in the criticisms has been that DPAs and NPAs do not treat corporate
crime seriously enough, that corporations are “let off too easy” when they avoid
convictions, and that the DOJ has not been willing to treat “corporate criminals”
(possibly meaning both people and firms) with the harshness that the federal
system routinely inflicts on street offenders.77
There is a clear retributive color to these criticisms. When the DOJ appears
to pull punches in corporate cases, especially in high profile cases of extensive
and noteworthy harm, it leaves the impression that amply blameworthy
organizations are not getting what they deserve. What justice requires has not
been fully delivered and thus prosecutors have failed in their duties.

73. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 8, at § 9-28.010.
74. For a full description of this history, see Arlen & Buell, supra note 9.
75. See generally EISINGER, supra note 10; MATT TAIBBI, THE DIVIDE: AMERICAN INJUSTICE IN
THE AGE OF THE WEALTH GAP (2014).
76. See, e.g., Russell Mokhiber, Crime Without Conviction: The Rise of Deferred and Non
Prosecution Agreements, CORP. CRIME REP. (Dec. 28, 2005), https://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/
deferredreport.htm [https://perma.cc/2HTW-8PSK] (arguing that “the rise of [DPAs and NPAs] has
undermined the general deterrent and adverse publicity impact that results from corporate crime
prosecutions and convictions”); Uhlmann, supra note 10, at 1301–02 (arguing that the “disturbing trend”
of the DOJ’s use of DPAs and NPAs “undermines the rule of law”); Michael Patrick Wilt, Who Watches
the Watchmen? Accountability in Federal Corporate Criminal Prosecution Agreements, 43 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 61, 65 (2015) (criticizing DPAs and NPAs for “promoting unfairness within the criminal justice system
and creating uncertainty for corporations in planning and cooperating with the government”).
77. See generally sources cited supra note 10.
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In light of the analysis in this Article, this failure, and the persistence of
frustration and criticism, are inevitable because corporations can be blameworthy
but cannot be punished retributively. There will always be a gap between what
corporations deserve and what they receive.78 This is only one of many ways in
which our fraught relationship with the large modern business corporation leaves
us confused and unsatisfied.79
B. Why Indictments and Convictions Might Matter
It is predictable, of course, that the public would be dissatisfied with the
routine treatment of corporate crime using a legal vehicle called
“nonprosecution” or “deferred prosecution.” Especially against the background
of mass incarceration and widespread and visible procedural inequalities in
criminal justice, few things could be less attractive than pursuing major corporate
crimes—which, as in the opioid scandal, can involve especially aggravated moral
blameworthiness—with less prosecutorial action than is routinely used to pursue
minor street crime.
It is thus not surprising that in recent years the DOJ, in obvious reaction to
public criticism, has pursued more resolutions with corporations involving guilty
pleas, even as NPAs and DPAs have continued to dominate. Corporate pleas and
convictions have been particularly evident in more noteworthy cases, such as the
BP oil spill, the Walmart foreign bribery matter, and the LIBOR and Forex
trading affairs involving financial institutions that had previously resolved
criminal cases through NPAs. Fifteen years ago, conventional wisdom held
(mistakenly, it turned out) that reputable corporations could not survive
indictment and that the prosecution of the Arthur Andersen accounting firm had
proved the folly of prosecutors pursuing corporate convictions.80
A conundrum in the modern practice of corporate criminal liability is why
conviction for corporations should matter when the criminal process cannot
impose sanctions on corporations that are different in kind, or even theoretically
in degree, than civil lawsuits and regulatory enforcement actions.81 A common
answer is that criminal convictions carry the potential of crippling delicensing and
debarment sanctions, collateral consequences that may not be available under
civil regimes. That is undoubtedly the major reason convictions matter to firms
and their lawyers. But it seems unlikely that public dissatisfaction with DPAs and

78. See Mihailis E. Diamantis, Clockwork Corporations: A Character Theory of Corporate
Punishment, 103 IOWA L. REV. 507, 517 (2018) (“Despite its presence in the popular press, the
retributivist approach to corporate punishment is relatively under-theorized, and it is a minority position
among academics. Those who do embrace retributivism usually work with an expressive form of the
theory according to which criminal law is a tool for expressing public moral condemnation.”).
79. See generally BUELL, supra note 9.
80. See, e.g., Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting Corporations Revisited: Lessons of the Arthur Andersen
Prosecution, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107 (2006).
81. Khanna, supra note 11, at 1492–93; see also Thomas, supra note 7, at 617 (“The failure of
corporate-criminal fines is that, as a sanction purportedly expressing particularly severe condemnation,
they nevertheless are indistinguishable from civil sanctions.”).
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NPAs has been grounded in the relatively obscure matter of debarment rules
under federal law.
A more plausible explanation for the significance of pleas and convictions is
that they express legal consecration of the corporation’s wrongdoing and
blameworthiness to a degree that DPAs and NPAs cannot.82 Even though such
agreements typically require companies to admit the facts of wrongdoing, they
do not require companies to say “guilty” in court and they do not involve an
independent judicial officer entering a judgment of conviction on a court’s docket
and performing the ritual of imposing a “sentence” (as opposed to the parties’
agreement to similar sanctions by the terms of a contract).
This expression may well matter to the public, and thus to the DOJ, because
it treats corporate crime with the sort of condemnation that seems deserved.
Doing so may (or may not) have social welfare benefits—a question that warrants
continued exploration. But whatever the conviction and sentencing of a
corporation is, it is not, and cannot be, retributive. It must be justified according
to the consequences that follow from it.
V
CONCLUSION
Retributivism is, after all, a theory of punishment—not, or not ultimately, a
theory of responsibility. Retributive punishment is punishment that causes, or is
at least meant to cause, its subject to experience and endure pain, suffering, or a
deprivation of substantial rights or interests. Without at least the expectation of
such an experience, punishment cannot affect its subject in a manner that could
be deserved on account of the moral wrong that is a crime. Because corporations
cannot experience such pain, suffering, or deprivations, they cannot be punished
on retributive grounds.
“Corporate retribution” is thus no such thing. To the extent that use of this
terminology persists in the discussion of corporate crime, it is a placeholder for a
line of consequentialist argument. Analysis of corporate crime should continue
to pursue the difficult question of whether and how it is justified and beneficial
to engage in blame-based projects of prosecuting and convicting corporations.
Important puzzles remain to be solved about the use of criminal law’s potent
moral tools against institutions rather than people. Meanwhile, it is a confusion
and a distraction to continue to discuss corporate criminality as if it were anything
other than a rich instrumental problem. This Article has been a call to stop doing
so.

82. Fisse, supra note 46.

